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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps this reformation will come with an opinion as significant in
the area of poverty law as Brown v. Board of Education41 was in civil
rights. King v. Smith is far from being that case. What is called for is
something on the order of a decision insuring, as a right, a minimum
standard of material comfort.42
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.
Torts-Recent Extensions in Builder-Vendor's Liability for Defects
For the buyer of a home who suffers injury or loss due to defective
construction,1 the traditional obstacle in a suit against the builder-vendor
has been the ancient rule of caveat emptor,2 that unless the vendee has
a claim of fraud or of breach of expressed warranty, he takes the risk
himself of quality and condition.2 Today that rule is subject to broad
and growing exceptions, 4 which threaten to replace it with implied war-
ranty and a general duty of due care.
Some of these expanding areas are touched upon by a recent South
Carolina case. In Rogers v. Scyphers,5 'the wife of the vendee of a new
house sued the subdeveloper' for negligent construction and for negligent
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Or one implementing Professor Reich's "theory of entitlement" to welfare
benefits; Professor Reich would elevate the receipt of public assistance, long
regarded as a privilege, to the status of a legal right. Reich, supra note 34, at
1252.
' Construction is described as "defective" if it is faulty, or lacking something
essential to its completeness, or not reasonably safe for its anticipated use. Gallo-
way v. City of Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 92, 184 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1944) ; Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 506 (4th ed. 1951).
'See, e.g., Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925), overruled
by Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co. 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441 (1961). See
generally 55 Amf. JtnR. Vendor and Purchaser § 57 (1946); 7 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW oF CONTRAcTS § 926A (3d ed. 1963).
'See, e.g., State ex. rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d
19, 20 (1944), overrded by Morrow v. Caloric Appl. Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963). See Note, Right of Purchaser in Sale of Defective House, 4 WEST. REs.
L. REv. 357 (1953) for a survey of vendee's limitations fifteen years ago.
'See notes 8, 24, 25, 41 & 43 infra. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Bearman].
- S.C. -, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
'Mrs. Rogers sued the Industrial Life Insurance Company, which actually
built the house, and Scyphers, who was president and principal stockholder in
the company and was supervisor of the construction. The company conveyed the
house to Scyphers, who sold it to Rogers. The court does not distinguish one
defendant from the other. Id.
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failure to disclose a latent danger. The complaint alleged that a fold-up
attic stairway had been attached by merely hanging it in the molding,
without any bolts or other secure fastenings. Mrs. Rogers used the stair-
way and was injured when it collapsed.
In affirming the sufficiency of the complaint, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held:
[T]here was a duty on the defendants as builders to use reasonable
care in the construction of the home to avoid unreasonable risk and
danger to those who would normally be expected to occupy it, and a
duty to disclose to the purchaser any dangerous condition of which
they knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care.7
The leading authority for the decision is a growing body of negligence
law' reflected by 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 (1965), which
subjects to liability a vendor who fails to disclose an unreasonably risky
condition of which he knows or has reason to know.9
The most significant language of the court's opinion deals with the
degree of knowledge of the defect that the vendor must have before lia-
bility will attach. The present Restatement's phrase that vendor "know
or have reason to know"1 of the defect is a distinct shift" from the first
7 S.C. at --, 161 S.E.2d at 84 (emphasis added).
' Bray v. Cross, 98 Ga. App. 612, 106 S.E.2d 315 (1958), criticized in Whiten
v. Orr Constr. Co., 109 Ga. App. 267, 136 S.E.2d 136 (1964); Derby v. Public
Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955); McCabe v. Cohen, 268 App. Div.
1064, 52 N.Y.S.2d 903, aff'd per curiamn, 294 N.Y. 522, 63 N.E.2d 88 (1945);
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Fisher
v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961); see note 11 infra. Cf. Farra-
gher v. City of New York, 26 App. Div. 2d 494, 275 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966); 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353(2) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT 2D]. See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 218 (1949).
'RESTATEMENT 2D §353(1), quoted in full in Rogers v. Scyphers, - S.C.
-,-, 161 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1968), states:
A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk
to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon
the land with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm
caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition
or risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and re-
alizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that
the vendee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
" RESTATEMENT 2D § 353 (1) (b).
" See Caporaletti v. A-F Corp., 137 F. Supp. 14 (D.D.C. 1956), commented
on in Bearman at 568; Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co., 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d
441 (1961), noted in Note, Liability of Vendor of Real Property, 29 TENN. L.
REV. 588 (1962). These cases, both of which cite 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 353(1) (1934), best demonstrate the change in judicial thinking that resulted
in the "know or have reason to know" standard.
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Restatement, which required actual knowledge. 2 Rogers took one fur-
ther step and held that the vendor must disclose defects of which he
"knew or should have known." This is not a meaningless change in
words.'" Although it is not clear whether the court recognized the im-
portance of the phrase, the court clearly adopted a broader standard of
negligence. "To have reason to know" means that the vendor possesses
certain information that would lead a reasonable man to infer that the
defect exists. That the vendor should disclose defects of which he knew
or "should have known" implies that he is under a legal duty to use or-
dinary care to warn of any defect that a reasonable man would have per-
ceived.' 4 The threshold problem of vendor's knowledge is avoided, and
defendant builder-vendor's conduct will be judged entirely by the reason-
able man standard.' In practical terms, if the plaintiff's attorney cannot
prove the defendant did have actual knowledge, he may rely on the jury's
decision whether a reasonable man would have known of (or taken steps
to discover) the defective condition.
This problem of the degree of knowledge vendor must have is anal-
ogous to the divergence of authority on the comparable point in the law
of landlord and tenant.'" Irrespective of any lease provisions about a duty
to repair, the landlord will be responsible for any injury due to a latent
122 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 353(1) (1934). The early basis for holding a
vendor liable for hidden defects was fraud. A vendor owed a duty to reveal facts
of which he knew or had notice. See, e.g., Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349,
164 P.2d 8 (1945); Weikel v. Stearns, 142 Ky. 513, 134 S.W. 908 (1911);
Mincy v. Crisler, 132 Miss. 223, 96 So. 162 (1923); Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co.,
253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454 (1960).
The only authority for § 353 of the first RESTATEMENT was dicta in Kilmer
v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1930) and in Palmore v. Morris, Tasker
& Co., 182 Pa. 82, 90, 37 A. 995, 999 (1897), according to W. PROSSER & Y.
SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 540 n.3 (4th ed. 1967); however, Kilmer
was itself based on the tentative draft of § 353, first RESTATEMENT.
1 Cf., e.g., State ex. rel. Bohen v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955).
The court sustained with leave to amend a demurrer to a complaint that alleged
the lessor knew or should have known of the defect. The court said the complaint
must allege that he knew or should have had reason to know.RESTATEMENT 2D § 12 & comment a. See also id. § 353, comment c.1 It is not clear whether a vendor would be under a duty to inspect his premises.
A jury could decide that a reasonable man using ordinary care would not inspect
under the circumstances. In a similar field of law, a landowner is under a general
duty to use reasonable care to protect his invitees. Many courts have held that
this means he must inspect in order to discover dangerous conditions. See 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.12 at 1487 (1956) ; W. PRossa,
THE LAw OF TORTS § 61, at 402-05 (3d ed. 1964).
"o Some courts have criticized the analogy of the vendor's duty to the lessor's duty,
arguing that the lessor and lessee have a continuing relationship, but the relation-
ship between the vendor and the vendee terminates upon completion of the sale.
See Samicandro v. Lake Dev., Inc., 55 N.J. Super. 475, 480, 151 A.2d 48, 51
(App. Div. 1959); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 218, 220 (1949).
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defect in the premises at the time of letting, if the landlord in fact knew
of the danger, and if the tenant did not..7 Many courts will go farther,
and impose liability if the landlord had some reason to believe or informa-
tion to infer that the defect existed.18 To complete the disarray, other
jurisdictions, comparable to South Carolina in Rogers, ask only whether
the landlord should have known of the defect.' 9 Since this inconsistency
in the older field of landlord's liability has not yet been resolved, it may
persist in vendor-vendee law for some time.
The Rogers court did not extend its new standard to all of vendor-
vendee law. Although the court broadened the scope of liability,20 it
limited that liability to builder-vendors. Because the non-building vendor
is likely to be an ordinary citizen re-selling a used house, courts may be
reluctant to abandon the "reason to know" standard of the Restatement.
In subjecting the builder-vendor to a duty of due care, the South
Carolina court cited another group of cases that hold a building con-
tractor responsible for his negligence.2' MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.22 held that a chattel manufacturer may be liable to a third person for
injury caused by the negligent manufacture of his product. Subse-
quently, courts applied the same rule to a contractor, that is, that he would
be liable if his negligent work caused harm to a third person with whom
he was not in privity, even after the contractee had accepted the work
as satisfactory,2" or had purchased the structure from the contractor.2-
"* Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 44, 195 N.E.2d 1 (1963) ;
Taylor v. Geroff, 347 Ill. App. 55, 106 N.E.2d 210 (1952); Janis v. Jost, 412
S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1967); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (App.
Div. 1953); Corcione v. Ruggieri, 87 R.I. 182, 139 A.2d 388 (1958). Cf. United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
8 Brandt v. Yeager, - Del. -, 199 A.2d 768 (Super. Ct. 1964); State ex
rel. Bohen v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955); Johnson v. O'Brien,
258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244 (1960); Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722,
160 S.W. 11 (1913); RESTATEMENT 2D § 358.
"o Downs v. Powell, 215 Ga. 62, 108 S.E.2d 715 (1959); Harrill v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945) (dictum).
"Cf. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. , , 154 N.W.2d 803,
806 (1967) (dictum), which suggests that the standard be liability for defects of
which a reasonable man (builder-vendor) would have known.
__ S. C. at -, 161 S.E.2d at 83.22217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See RESTATEMENT 2D § 395.2 8Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 989
(1956); Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Inman v.
Binghamton Housing Auth., 1 App. Div. 2d 559, 152 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1956), rev'd
on other grounds, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957);
Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1962); RESTATEMENT 2D § 385. Cf.
Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal. 2d 857, 362 P.2d 345, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1961). Contra,
Clyde v. Sumerel, 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d 392 (1958).
' Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948); Leigh v. Wadsworth,
361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961).
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If caveat emptor would be no defense in an action by an injured third
party against a builder-vendor, then neither should it be an obstacle to
the contractee-vendee. Like other cases before it,2" Rogers held that the
builder-vendor" owed the same duty to his vendee that he would owe
to a foreseeable third party. The court thus places liability upon the sub-
developer in his role both as a vendor and as a builder.
One serious limitation to recovery, which is reiterated in Rogers,2 7
is that liability will arise only for those defects that are latent or con-
cealed. The rule that a producer is under no duty to safeguard against
an obvious danger is widely applied in the field of negligent manufacture
of chattel,2 and has been carried over into cases of lessor's2" or vendor's80
failure to disclose defects.
Problems appear with the latent defect rule when a court fails to dis-
tinguish between an obvious defective physical condition and the risks
inherent in that condition." The lack of a safety cab atop an earthmover
is certainly obvious, but how obvious is the risk that the uplifted shovel
will fall backwards and crush the operator?2 Trial courts limit the jury
2 Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963);
Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961). See also Brown,
Building Contractor's Liability After Completion and Acceptance, 16 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 193 (1967).
" Cf. Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 253 Cal. App. 2d -, 61 Cal. Rptr.
333 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), which held that the financier (a savings and loan as-
sociation) of the subdeveloper owed a duty of due care to the ultimate home pur-
chaser. He could be found to have breached that duty by negligently backing an
inexperienced subdeveloper.
" - S. C. at -, 161 S.E.2d at 85.2 Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Standard Con-
veyor Co. v. Scott, 221 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1955); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare
Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d 217 (1945); Douglas v. W.C. Mallison &
Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965); Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C.
557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802(1950); Parker v. Heasler Plumb. & Heat. Co., 388 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1964).
2 Kearns v. Smith, 55 Cal. App. 2d 535, 131 P.2d 36 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
Brandt v. Yeager, - Del. -, 199 A.2d 768, (Super. Ct. 1964); Downs v. Powell,
215 Ga. 62, 108 S.E.2d 715 (1959); Janis v. Jost, 412 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1967);
Harrill v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945). Cf. United
States v. Inmon, 205 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1953).
"o Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 213, 112 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1961) (dictum);
cf. Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957) (building contractor).
"
1See, e.g., Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913) (roof
poles too weak to support the roof were an obvious defect); Harrill v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 225 N.C. 421, 35 S.E.2d 240 (1945)(The difficulty in raising an over-
head door was obvious, even if the faulty construction, which would cause the
door to fall, was not.).
"2 Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1959) (held an obvious
danger), criticized in Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 837-39 (1962).
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function by citing a lack of evidence of a latent defect33 and then dismiss-
ing the case on the ground that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty.34
A new approach to the latent defect rule has been taken in the case of
Totten v. Gruzen,35 in which the minor son of a tenant sued the builder
of the apartment for negligently exposing a steam pipe. The infant be-
came entangled with the pipe in his own bedroom and was severely
burned. The court refused to follow a strict latency rule, holding instead
that the obviousness of a defect is only one factor in the jury's deter-
mination of the defendant's negligence, and not an insurmountable bar-
rier to recovery. The defendant's creation of a highly visible defect may
still create an unreasonable risk.3 This recent decision assuages the
harsher aspects of the latency requirement, and restores to the jury its
freedom to judge the defendant's conduct by a reasonable man standard.
Yet if Totten signals an abandonment of "latent defect," tort lia-
bility will not have advanced far. 7 A vendee injured by an obvious
danger will likely be faced with the defenses of contributory negligence
or assumption of the risk.' If a vendor warns his vendee of an otherwise
latent defect, but an unwarned third person is nonetheless injured, the
patency created by the warning may not permit the judge to dismiss be-
cause of the absence of a duty, but the warning will perhaps cause the
jury to find the vendor not to be negligent. 9
The law of negligence has not been the only field in which the builder-
vendor's liability has grown. Recent years have featured widespread
imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers for injuries to the ulti-
mate consumer caused by defective products. The courts imply a war-
"See, e.g., Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, 239 Mo. App. 355, 186 S.W.2d
217 (1945). In affirming a non-suit, the court held that any reasonable person
would have realized the unusually high risk of flammability of a "Fuzzy Wuzzy"
lounging robe.
" If the case should get to the jury, the defendant would of course have the
advantage of the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. It
is suggested that the hesitancy of juries to reach a defendant's verdict based on
one of these defenses is a strong influence in the retention of the latency rule.
Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product,
71 YALE L.J. 816, 837 (1962). Some courts compromise the problem by submitting
to the jury the issue of whether there was latent defect. See, e.g., Couch v. Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 857, 183 P.2d 91 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1 (1968).
This holding was suggested in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 87,
207 A.2d 314, 323 (1965).
", RESTATEMENT 2D does not speak in terms of latent defect, but still manages
adequately to define liability. See §§ 351-56, 358, 402A.
'8 See note 34 supra.
"See generally W. PROSSER, TiE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 179-81 (3d ed. 1964).
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ranty that the product is safe for its intended use.40 Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons41 moved the law into the home construction industry.42 It broke
through the traditional distinction between realty and chattel, and as-
serted that mass production of housing should be treated like mass pro-
duction of personal products. The buyer of a home may rely on an implied
warranty that his house was built in a workmanlike manner and is suit-
able for habitation.43  The South Carolina court in Rogers recognizes
that implied warranty is the modern trend and (as dictum) cites favor-
ably the leading cases. 4
Implied warranty theory transcends problems of the vendor's knowl-
edge of a defect. Liability is imposed without fault and without regard
to a judgment upon the defendant's conduct. It is, nevertheless, the con-
trast between the inexperience of the typical home buyer and the knowl-
edge and training of the builder-vendor that allows the former to rely
on the latter by way of implied warranty. 45 Liability does not pivot on
whether the builder-vendor should have known of a defect, but rather
upon the vendee's reliance on the builder-vendor's skill to build a house
fit for habitation.
In order to recover on strict liability, the plaintiff must still prove a
defective condition. 46 The home buyer may feel that his new purchase
°Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mtrs., Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT 2D §402A. See generally Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINx. L. REv. 791 (1966).
' 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), noted in Note, Implied Warranty in Real
Estate-Privity Requirement, 44 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1965).
"' Implied warranty already had a foothold. Several courts had held there to
be an implied warranty of fitness when the purchaser bought his house while the
builder-vendor was in the process of erecting it, but not after the house was com-
pleted. Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957);
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Bldrs., Inc., 52
Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) ; Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R.
390 (C.A.). But see Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 83, 388 P.2d 399, 402(1964), which refutes this distinction as unreasonable.
"Accord, Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) ; Waggoner
v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton,
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
"'- S.C. at -, 161 S.E.2d at 83.
"' Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 62, 415 P.2d 698, 705 (1966); Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965); Waggoner v. Mid-
western Dev. Co., - S.D. -, -, 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (1967). Cf. Bearman 574.
" Markwell v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 367 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965);
Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958); Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 1057, 1078-79 (1967). But cf. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.
App. 2d 855, 858, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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is generally unsatisfactory,47 but he may only win damages for harm
caused by workmanship unfit for the anticipated use. The defendant will
be held to the standard of normal, safe construction, not to the standard
of perfection.4s
Strict liability based upon implied warranty has not yet been ex-
tended beyond the builder-vendor. The vendor who resells an old house
(and who may be liable under Restatement § 353) stands usually on the
same level as the vendee himself and cannot be analogized to the manu-
facturer. Courts may be hesitant also to impose strict liability upon the
ordinary building contractor, because he is selling his services but not
selling any goods.49
Although the law of builder-vendor's liability is now in a fluid state,
its broad direction is evident. Special protections for the defendant are
being replaced by obligations comparable to those of a supplier of chattel
or of a negligent building contractor. For the individual who is injured
by defective construction, the field of builder-vendor's liability offers new
potential for recovery.
RICHARD F. MITCHELL
Trade Regulations-Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d)-
Promotional Allowances
The Robinson-Patman Act1 has been labeled a "masterpiece of ob-
scurity," "prolix and perplexing," and a "hodgepodge of confusion and
inconsistency."'2 As predicted,3 the Federal Trade Commission and the
" One wag stated, "Today's buyers do not understand that when you buy a
$10,000 house, you just can't expect gold doorknobs." Bearman 573 n.143.
48 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; Wag-
goner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., - S.D. -, -, 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (1967).
" RESTATEMENT 2D § 402A & comment f; cf. Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Cen-
ter, 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964). But see Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J.
202, -, 245 A.2d 1, 5 (1968), which refused to deny that strict liability would be
applied to building contractors.
115 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1964).
1 F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 19,
535 & n.4 (1962, Supp. 1964) [hereinafter cited as RowE]. "In the end, the
political process of pressure, counterpressure and compromise created a cryptic
and sloppy legislative enactment, whose ineptitudes and solecisms opened up more
legal questions than they closed." Id. at 535.
' Representative Celler, during debate of the proposed Act in the House of
Representatives, predicted: "[T]he courts will have the devil's own job to unravel
the tangle. . . . You will have the herculean task to make it yield sense." 80
CONG. REc. 9419 (1936).
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